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Symbolic Name Strategies:  
Iran and the Persian Gulf  
 
 
 
 
Vedran Obućina  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
National and regional identities have always been and still are connected to territory. The 
sovereignty is largely perceived biased to a territory, although there are some authors who 
regard territoriality and state autonomy as irrelevant for the sovereignty. Of course, 
overwhelming number of countries in the world have territory. However, a country does not 
stem from nature. Rather, it is imaginative formation, and sovereignty cannot be based 
exclusively on territory, but primarily on imaginative community. The state sovereignty is by 
far the end result of particular discourse and imaginary. Institutional political science might 
have problems with this notion of sovereignty, but other social sciences, such as anthropology, 
considers sovereignty as monopoly where one is included or excluded from a political 
community, but also what constitutes order, security and normal life, as well as which means 
(including force) have to be taken not to endanger these principles. The complexity of 
sovereignty, however, goes beyond this debate. Even the anthropology stresses order and 
security, without which there is no normal life, no sovereignty, as the states collapse and 
become rogue. The role of space and spatial presence is especially accentuated in fragmented 
societies with deep religious, linguistic and ethnic divides. The politics of territoriality, thus, 
is act of political production, dynamic and changing construction, which based on its inherent 
exclusivity leads to bordering and conflicts (Blacksell, 2006: 20). This space, a territory, is 
further used for activity of territoriality as explained by Kevin E. Cox: the activity of 
defending, controlling, excluding, including (Cox, 2002: 1).  
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The area of the Persian Gulf is one of the most important regions for the world politics. It is 
the focus point of energy resources, and Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms play a 
pivotal role in the world. Precisely because of that, USA, as the world (declining) superpower 
has great interest in the area, as visible in stationing its Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf. That is 
why the Persian Gulf policy is important on both sides of the Gulf. In the 1960s however, 
Arab world increasingly began calling the Gulf “Arabian”. The Iranian side thinks it threatens 
part of historical and cultural identity and heritage of humanity.  
It is vital to understand the symbolic nature of this dispute. It is not a novel idea that every 
nation and every culture has its symbols. But for overtly rational political science it is not of 
particular interest. This is unfortunate; as many case studies show the symbols and symbolic 
behaviour are paramount for explaining, and especially understanding, the political thinking, 
behaviour and decision making. One cannot forget the quote from Evans-Pritchard, “the most 
difficult task in social anthropological field work is to determine the meanings of a few key 
words, upon an understanding of which the success of the whole investigation depends” 
(Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 80). Thus, for the understanding, and not just explaining, the relations 
between the Arab and Iranian side, one has to understand the meaning of the geographical 
names as symbolic capital. These names form values, concepts and orientations, or themes, 
around which many decisions are being made.  
In this article I use the UN recognized name for the gulf in question, and spell it out 
interchangeably as either the Persian Gulf or the Gulf when considering the wider geopolitical 
area. This is based on an editorial directive from 1999, when the Secretariat of the United 
Nations stated that the term “Persian Gulf” is used by the Secretariat as the standard 
geographical term. Moreover, the term “Gulf” is used by the Secretariat to identify or refer to 
the general geographical area such as the Gulf area, the Gulf region and the Gulf States.  
 
IRANIAN-ARAB RELATIONS IN THE GULF 
 
The twenty-year period of relations between Iran and the Gulf states since the Islamic 
revolution of 1979 until 1998 can best be characterised as turbulent and unstable since it 
included major changes such as the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Gulf Crisis 
(1990-1991), as well as regional conflicts such as the dispute over Abu Musa and Tunb 
islands, and the problems at the annual hajj pilgrimage (Marshall, 2003: 2). Iranian relations 
with the Gulf States were largely restrained by distrust and the Arab rulers’ fears of Iranian 
domination. As a result, symbolic strategies are used to proclaim the region “Arabic” or 
“Persian”. This battle of symbols accelerated after the overthrown of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, 
as post-Saddam Iraq became overtly Shi’a dominated, in close contact with Tehran regarding 
economical, social and military aid. This stronghold of Shi’ism forms a real problem, as seen 
in 2007 by Ehteshami and Zweiri: “The political resurgence of Shi’a communities is a fear 
that plagues many of the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, many of which have 
substantial Shi’a populations of their own to manage” (Ehteshami, Zweiri, 2007: 99). In fact, 
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their words met the truth during the uprising labelled Arab Spring that occurred throughout 
the Arab world. It included the biggest Shi’a community in the Persian Gulf outside Iran and 
Iraq, Bahrain. The Shi’a majority in the country was awaken by Iranian-Iraqi cleric Hadi al-
Mudarrisi, a personal representative of Khomeini in Bahrain, which culminated in riots during 
1979 and especially in 1981, and forming of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, 
with headquarters in Tehran (Panah, 2007: 74, 75). Similar organisations and activities were 
formed in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Eventually, these 
uprisings led to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981, as some 
sort of containment versus Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf (Ehteshami, 1995: 132; 
Legrenzi, 2002: 25). It also supported Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, by giving Saddam Hussein 
finances and military aid (Panah, 2007: 85), and was organised under the tutelage of USA and 
UK (Mafinezam, Mehrabi, 2007: 69). After the war, the export of the revolution seized, as 
numerous obstacles emerged, especially considering Iranian national pride connected to 
Shi’ism, which wasn’t favoured among many Shi’ites of Arab descents. Although the export 
itself failed, the Islamic movements mushroomed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
various countries of Middle East and North Africa.  
The Arabs decided to call the Gulf “Arabian” during the height of Arab nationalism in the 
1950s and 1960s. At the time Pan-Arabism was at its highest, leading to later failed political 
project of unification of the Arab world. The idea is in fact a bit older, as it united Arabs in 
their efforts to fight against the Ottomans and subsequent colonial or semi-colonial rule by the 
European powers. It is no wonder Nasser was the one who proclaimed the Gulf “Arab”, as 
Egypt was often seen as the hub of Pan-Arabic feelings and attitudes (El Bernoussi, 2014: 9), 
as well as the place where the idea of the Arab League was conceived, whereby “...Nasserism 
used the League as a framework for Arab action” as the Nasserism didn’t regard Pan-Arabism 
“...as simply the existence of loose cultural, social, economic and even political bonds 
between Arab states, Nasserism decided to turn it into an ideology, imposing a higher form of 
solidarity on the Arab scene, which did not correspond in practice with the actual state of 
affairs, except on the emotional level” (Sirriyeh, 2000: 54). In effect, Pan-Arabism was “a 
macro nationalism, or the projection of micro nationalism onto the larger geographical area, 
based on common interests (religion, culture and race) as the basis of aspiration for political 
entity, in more than one state” (Henry, 2003: 297). The accent on macro nationalism is 
important. Next to the idea of nation state, never really accepted in its Western meaning, Arab 
countries focused on the shared tradition of Islamic values, importance of Shari’a, and 
common Muslim community ummah, as well as socialist ideas, revolutionary zeal and 
technical modernisation.  
The identification process with Pan-Arab movement is traceable in almost all Arab countries, 
but its decline in late 1970s showed how the regional identities gain more ground. As the 
demise of Pan-Arabism occurred, a distinct notion of khaliji (Gulf) identity occurred in the 
GCC countries (Legrenzi, 2002: 32). In this sense, it might be even clearer why the name for 
the Gulf in GCC countries is “Arabian” and not “Arab”. Both names would have been 
linguistically correct, but GCC countries use the name of Arabian Gulf with spectacular care. 
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It doesn’t show the “Arab” character of the region, but Arabian, as they form the identity of 
Arabia, and not of the whole Arab world. The Pan-Arabism again came to the fore through 
the ideas and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, although it is primarily a Pan-Islamic 
movement, the same as Mawdudi’s ideas in Pakistan, Khomeini’s in Iran, etc. It is also visible 
in the attitude toward the Palestinian question. The Pan-Arabic notion can be seen also in the 
Arab Spring, as the protests showed Arab solidarity.  
Ever since, the term has been a reason for serious disagreement and a widened “gulf” between 
the two peoples, between Iran on the one side, and GCC countries on the other. This dispute 
has to be solved if any real cooperation on both sides of the Gulf is going to be achieved, but 
it involves more than just the name change. It is a symbol of deep mistrust: “The dispute, 
which continues to affect relations, is symptomatic of a bigger problem, we suggest, and has 
much to do with role perception as well as the prevailing balance of power in the region” 
(Ehteshami, Zweiri, 2007: 102). The name is a symbol of power, and for Arabs the official 
UN name means Iran enjoys dominance in the region. As the Arab national and economic 
powers grew after the Second World War, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser 
proclaimed a global campaign in 1968 of changing the name of Persian Gulf to Arabian Gulf, 
as a showcase of Arab presence and overall character in the region. Later, GCC countries 
accepted this name and started to lobby and campaign worldwide for acceptance of this name. 
Both Shah Pahlavi and the leaders of the Islamic Republic showed great discomfort and 
rejection of Arab states’ renaming of the Gulf, whose Persian adjective has been recognised 
by the United Nations. Iran claims the right to historical name again because of the politics of 
memory and politics of history: the Persian Gulf is Persian because since Achaemenid 
dynasty Iranians have been present in this region. They conquered Bahrain, expelled 
Portuguese from Hormuz straits, built a navy, and only succumbed under the pressure of 
British in 18
th
 century. Challenges from 19
th
 century endured. British domination in Iraq and 
its influence over the ailing Ottoman court resulted in division of Shatt al-Arab. Oil rich 
future province of Khuzestan became an Iranian province, a decision that provoked war by 
Saddam Hussein in 1980. On the other hand, British gave islands of Abu Musa and Tunb to 
emirate of Sharjah, a decision still contested between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The 
subsequent name change in Arab countries is seen in Tehran as a direct attack on 
multiculturalism of the region, suppression of rightful Iranian identity and international legal 
rights. More importantly, it is seen as a move directed to destabilize Iran internally, causing 
havoc within the Arab-speaking minority in Iran. At the time, Iran was biggest ally of USA in 
the Middle East and had three major objectives shared with Washington: to protect the safety 
of the Shah’s regime against internal subversion sponsored by radical Arab regimes or the 
Soviet Union; to prevent radicalism dominating any other Gulf state; to protect Iranian oil 
resources and installations; and to preserve freedom of navigation (Marshall, 2003). The 
backup and the British withdrawal from the Gulf resulted in Iranian occupation of the 
contested islands and the recognition of independent Bahrain. 
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EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION 
 
Immediately after the Islamic Revolution, it was revolutionary ideas that came at the fore of 
the Iranian policy toward the Persian Gulf, not nationalism. The policy was influenced by 
Iranian stand towards Palestinian question, Lebanon and hajj. Ayatollah Khomeini laid in the 
Constitution notions of oppressors (mustakbarin) and oppressed (mustazafin), in which 
oppressors are USA, other Western countries, but also the royal houses in the Arab states. 
With the idea of export of revolution, Iranian new authorities called for revolutions in the 
Arab kingdoms, and Muslim unity. In effect, Khomeini considered Iran just a base for all-
Muslim revolution. Maybe this is the biggest miscalculation of Khomeini, out of very little 
tactical mistakes in his political career. By considering Iran mere as a place which hosts the 
rightful movement, he underestimated deep national feeling and memory of Iranian people, 
and of many Iranian mullahs. Indeed, in first years of the Revolution Khomeini and his first 
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan suggested the name dispute to be solved by simply naming 
the gulf “Muslim” or “Islamic”. This suggestion was quickly withdrawn, as Iraq attacked Iran. 
The export of the revolution was not intended as staging a revolution in another country, but 
influencing with ideas and role model of the Islamic Revolution for particular segments of 
society looking to establish a just Islamic society. It was particularly oriented toward the Gulf 
monarchies, which are “...acting in the interests of imperialism and being puppet regimes” 
(Panah, 2007: 74). With the idea of export of revolution, Iranian new authorities called for 
revolutions in the Arab kingdoms, and Muslim unity. In effect, Khomeini considered Iran just 
a base for all-Muslim revolution and liberation of Muslim people suffering under the 
oppressive regimes. The royal Arab households are oppressors because they form the power 
elite, the leaders and chiefs who are object of opposition and resistance, according to Qur’an: 
“...they are responsible for oppression and should be the target of revolutionary struggle” 
(Lafraie, 2009: 44). It also included some other Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco, but didn’t include secular Turkey nor Pakistan, which whom new regime in Tehran 
sought to establish good relations.  
After Khomeini’s death, however, the obligation of exporting the revolution completely failed 
and Iranian officials satisfied with the revolution in one country. In the end, the national 
feelings prevailed. Relations with Arab neighbours, especially those among the GCC states 
gradually became better under the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, but the 
Iranian policy toward the Persian Gulf became essentially national and not Pan-Islamic. The 
religious principles in Persian Gulf policies were deemed eternal, not prone to bargain by 
changing governments or different political factions. Security and careful cooperation became 
major segments of Iranian Persian Gulf policy, while not forgetting the permanent obligation 
to the revolutionary principles. The problems persist, especially because of difficult status of 
Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain (where they form majority), Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
Only with Oman the relations are excellent, and Omani Sultan is often seen as an 
intermediary. One of the reasons is surely in religious symbolism – while most of the Arab 
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Gulf states, with exclusion of Iraq, are predominantly under the influence of Wahhabism, 
Oman is biggest Ibadi country in the world. 
 
CONTINUING DISPUTES 
 
The relations between GCC countries and Iran improved remarkably during the Rafsanjani 
and Khatami presidencies, and with a benevolent stand of Omani Sultan Qaboos. It continued 
under Ahamdinejad presidencies, as both Iranian and Saudi leaders showed publicly affection 
between two religiously connected countries. It was an effect of change of tune in the Iranian 
foreign policy, where confrontationist and revolutionary speech was gradually substituted by 
a more diplomatic and pragmatic standpoint, and especially after King Abdullah came to 
throne in Riyadh. But, the core problems stayed. Additional shortcomings in the relationship 
in the Persian Gulf include Iranian nuclear program and surface-to-surface missiles, which is 
considered a threat in Arab countries, and which Tehran failed to correctly explain to the 
same countries (Ehteshami, Zweiri, 2007: 103). On the other side, since 1984 the GCC 
countries established the Peninsula Shield Force for rapid deployment against external 
aggression, comprising “...units from the armed forces of each country under a central 
command based in Saudi Arabia” (Legrenti, 2002: 25). Given the American presence in the 
region, and the proximity of GCC countries to the Iraqi government, but also the experience 
in Kuwait, this force was obviously made as a containment against Iran, and later changed its 
orientation while still preserving the same idea of the military alliance.  
The international pressure of the GCC countries can easily be seen in subsequent Summits of 
South American and Arab countries in 2000s. In Brasilia Declaration of 2005 the countries on 
summit “call upon Iran Islamic Republic for a positive response to the United Arab Emirates 
initiative to reach a peaceful settlement for the three UAE islands question (Tonb Alkobra, 
Tonb Alsoukra and Abou Moussa) through dialogue and direct negotiations, in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter and International Law”. The same sentence was incorporated 
in the Doha Declaration of 2009, as well as in some other international and bilateral 
declarations (for example in a joint meeting between the EU and the GCC countries in 
Brussels) although the issue is obviously and solely bilateral problem between UAE and Iran.  
The name strategy is obvious way to determine who has more power and influence in one of 
the world’s most important geopolitical areas. In 2006 Iranians delivered to the UN’s Group 
of experts on geographical names a provisional agenda stating that “...any change, destruction, 
or alteration of the names registered in historical deeds and maps is like the destruction of 
ancient works and is considered as an improper action. (...) the names of geographical features 
(...) should not be utilized as political instruments in reaching a political, tribal and rational 
objective, or in any clash with national interests and other’s values”. The document lists 
number of historical references to the Gulf as Persian (Fars), beginning from the Pars Sea in 
the Pars Empire, the travel accounts of Pythagoras, Diseark, Herodotus, medieval Islamic 
travellers, to the Portuguese rule of Hormuz, and all the way to at least ten contracts signed 
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from 1507 to 1960 including mostly the Arab countries. There are also vastly documented 
maps throughout this period, which attest to the world’s decision to label this gulf as Persian. 
As the final decision, the United Nations use the name too.  
 
IRANIAN ARAB MINORITY AND INFLUENCE OF PAN-ARABISM 
 
The rise of Pan-Arab nationalism threatens the integrity of Iran. It started openly with a 
conference of Arab jurists that declared Iranian province of Khuzestan an integral part of the 
Arab homeland, and continued with Egyptian influence over neighbouring Arab countries to 
foster Pan-Arab politics in the “Arabian Gulf”.  
The complex political system of Iran is followed by rather easy and logical territorial structure. 
Iran is divided into five regions, which is a decision brought by Rouhani government. The 
official division is based on thirty one provinces (ostan), governed by an appointed governor 
(ostandar). These are by alphabetic order: Alborz, Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, 
Bushehr, Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiari, Esfahan, Fars, Gilan, Golestan, Hamadan, Hormozgan, 
Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan North, Khorasan Razavi, Khorasan South, Khuzestan, 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Kordestan, Lorestan, Markazi, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Qom, 
Semnan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Tehran, Yazd and Zanjan. The provinces are further divided 
into counties (shahrestan, lit.the land of the city), and subdivided into districts (bakhsh, 
lit.district) and sub-districts (dehestan, lit. the village space). Although divided in provinces, 
Iran is not a federal state. There has been much debate over the local and regional autonomies, 
decentralisation and other forms of devolving mechanisms for sub-national units, especially 
those that are homes for large numbers of ethnic minorities. The government so far has not 
answered these questions. Many presidential candidates stressed the importance of answering 
the ethnic and religious minorities’ requests. They have travelled extensively in these areas to 
claim their support, both from the reformists and conservative camps. It is interesting only 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not talk about ethnic issues or make special promises to ethnic 
minorities, but he “...emphasised the need to decentralise the state bureaucracy and empower 
the provincial governors, this was seen in line with his election platform of “social justice” 
and change in distributive policies, as Ahmadinejad promised he would put national wealth at 
the service of the masses and not the economic elite concentrated in central part of 
Iran”(Tohidi, 2009: 318). It is interesting thus, that Ahmadinejad in fact softened large 
amount of ethnic minorities, focusing on his populist appeal of return to the revolutionary 
ideas of equality, justice and anticorruption, highlighting his own humble background, austere 
lifestyle, visible already in his clothes, named khaksari (down-to-earth), like notorious five-
dollar shirts, rejecting Western clothes and condemning the wearing of neckties, as a sign of 
submission to the Crusaders (David, Robinson, 2006).  
In the 20
th
 century, Iran has embarked on massive Iranization of provinces’ and cities’ names. 
It began with rightful distinction between Persia and Iran. For many centuries, Iran was called 
by its Hellenised name Persia, although Iranians themselves never seized to call their 
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homeland Iran, which means Land of Aryans. The country was officially renamed in Iran in 
1935, under the Reza Pahlavi rule. Reza Shah famously warned all embassies in Tehran to use 
the name Iran and threatened to expel all those who use the name Persia. After the Islamic 
Revolution, the official name stayed in form of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since Pahlavi 
regime came to power after the overthrown of Qajar dynasty, language policies were used to 
strengthen the idea of Iranian nation state. The same is used under Islamic Republic, albeit 
with an important change of meaning. Under the Pahlavis the language was a tool for 
nationalism and tightening of the idea of an Iranian nation in modern sense. The Islamic 
Republic, however, puts accent not on nation of Iran, but on its Islamic character. While 
Pahlavi regime forbids all languages but Farsi, Islamic Republic gave constitutional 
possibility to use other languages as well. The Article 15 of the Constitutional Law states: 
“The common and official language and script of the people of Iran is Farsi. Official 
documents, correspondence and texts as well as textbooks must be in this language and script. 
However, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media or the teaching of 
their literature in schools, along with Farsi, shall be free”. It is a clear break with the policy of 
language assimilation by the Pahlavi regime. Also, Islamic Republic gave constitutional 
advantage to Arabic, as seen in the Article 16 of the Constitutional Law: “Since Arabic is the 
language of the Holy Qur’an and Islamic sciences and education, and Farsi language is 
completely intermixed with it, this language shall be taught in all classes and in all fields of 
knowledge after the primary classes up to the end of high school education”. As language of 
Qur’an and liturgy language of Islam all over the world, Arabic had great influence on Farsi. 
Although Pahlavi dynasty tried to Iranianize the language, it was still heavily intertwined with 
Arabic, a fact even further accentuated in the Islamic Republic. Arabic gives special identity 
to Iran as a Muslim nation and as an Islamic Republic; otherwise it would not be given the 
special constitutional presence. After all, “(T)he most common instrument of identity-building 
is language policy” (Beyme, 2014: 26). Indeed, the language has been used often as a tool for 
strengthening a nation state, especially in those countries where there was widespread 
presence of ethnic and national minorities (for example, Spain, USA, India, USSR, 
Yugoslavia). Iran resembles a society with dominant majority, where one ethnic community, 
Persians or Fars, is dominant and other minorities don’t have institutional cooperation with 
majority. Only well organized minorities have possibility to influence policies regarding their 
status. But as much as language policy may come from the centre, it can be a political weapon 
of minority as well.  
The large urbanisation and rise of urban centres in Iran caused these differences to be less 
visible, as the urbanism has a capacity to effectively address inter-group conflict in 
nationalistic settings; the cities indeed may be critical spatial, economic, and psychological 
contributors to national ethnic stability and reconciliation (Bollens, 2007: 1). Distant from the 
spheres of institutionalised politics, cities can offer real time face-to-face negotiations among 
neighbours of different ethnic backgrounds. Such is the case of Tehran or Esfahan, large 
conglomerations which host citizens stemming from all Iranian backgrounds. On the other 
hand, urban centres can become a focal point for unresolved nationalistic and ethnic conflict, 
as a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims involving areas outside the 
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urban region or for tensions related to foreign immigration (Bollens, 2007: 6). It can be 
noticed in some other Iranian cities, such as Ahvaz, Kermanshah, Zahedan and Tabriz. To 
research the cities is important, as Bollens mentions, because of the territorial, economical 
and political consequences: “(T)erritorially, cities can be important symbolic and military 
battlegrounds and flashpoints for violence between antagonistic ethnic groups seeking 
sovereignty, autonomy or independence. Economically, they are frequently focal points of 
urban and regional economies dependent on multi-ethnic contacts, social and cultural centres 
and platforms for political expression, and potential centres of grievance and mobilisation. 
Politically, cities can include or exclude minority groups from formal and informal 
participation processes, and they are arenas where the size and concentration o a subordinate 
population can present the most direct political threat to the state”.  
Arabs live in the south of Iran, around Persian Gulf, and make a bit more than three per cent 
of population. They adhere to both Shi’a and Sunni forms of Islam. The presence of Arabs in 
these areas stems back to the origins of the Persian Empire. Although many linguists and 
genealogists trace the origins of Arabs throughout contemporary Iran, today there are three 
main hubs of Arabic existence in Iran: Khuzestan, where most of Iranian Arabs live; Fars, 
where tribe of Khamseh reside; and Khorasan, where tribes of Sheybani, Zangooyi, Mishmast, 
Khozaima and Azdi live, but they speak predominantly Farsi. Nationalisms and the 
perceptions Iranians and Arabs have of themselves and of each other helped to shape policies 
of mistrust in the Persian Gulf. In approaching this, historical memory of Iran shapes the core 
of the Tehran’s policies toward the Persian Gulf. It is worldview that considers Iran a 
superpower solely because of the thousands years of history and indeed the presence in the 
Gulf, a presence which makes Arab kingdoms especially worried. Khuzestan was renamed 
during the Pahlavi regime from original name Arabestan. The whole region saw 
overwhelming change of names. Cities of Mohammareh, Al-Ahwaz, Khafajiyyeh, Howeizeh, 
Ma’shur and Fallahieh were renamed as Khorramshahr, Ahwaz, Sousangerd, Azadegan, 
Mahshahr, and Shadgan, respectively (Azizi-Banitorof, 2002). Number of Arabs living in 
Khuzestan is difficult to estimate, and it is between one third of the province (with Lurs and 
Persians consisting other two thirds) and overestimated number of 75 per cent of population. 
The language policy had its local resistance in using the dual names. Among themselves, 
Arabs in Khuzestan have used and still do use the Arab names of the cities; although in 
official correspondence only Iranian name is used.  
In comparison to some other ethnic minorities in Iran, such as Baloch and Kurds, Arabs are 
less prone to secessionism, especially because they are overwhelmingly Shi’ites. But, in the 
overall dispute over the Persian Gulf name and the Arab uprisings in recent years, the 
Khuzestan Arabs showed increasing dissatisfaction with their status within the Islamic 
Republic. Immediately after the Islamic Revolution, Khuzestani Arabs raised revolt asking for 
a bigger autonomy. The decline to federalise the country led to terrorist activities stemming 
from Khuzestan, including Iranian Embassy siege in London in 1980, when six armed men 
held Iranian embassy staff hostage. They were members of one of many small secessionist 
groups and armed fronts. After the Iran-Iraq war, which hit Khuzestan badly, the oil rich 
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province raised questions on ethnic issue and social justice. It is visible in the 2005 riots in 
Ahwaz. Two months prior to the 2005 presidential elections in Iran, Khuzestan was struck by 
ethnic-related riots, and presidential candidates thus placed special importance on the ethnic 
issues. Mehdi Karrubi, who stems from Lurestan and is himself an ethnic Lur, “...visited the 
city of Ahwaz in the Khuzestan province, and he praised the role of brave young people, 
particularly Arab, Lur, and the tribes of Khuzestan” (Tohini, 2009: 305). The approach was 
favoured among reformist and conservative presidential candidates alike, but the conservative 
elite weren’t too pleased with it. In late February 2005 the chairman of the powerful Guardian 
Council Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati condemned the candidates’ activities and later accused the 
United States of fanning the flames of ethnic and religious differences in Iran, as it did in 
Lebanon and Iraq. This provoked Hasan Abbasian, the chairman of the Association of 
Khuzestani Arabs in Tehran, to send an open letter to Jannati, calling his stand as unjust, 
undemocratic and un-Islamic. But not only conservatives have this stand; according to Tohini, 
many human rights activists, intellectuals and political organisations don’t stand up for the 
ethnic minorities’ rights. The riots in Ahwaz began after alleged circulation of a letter in 
which a prominent reformer advocated a government plan to transfer large number of Arabs 
to other parts of Iran and replacing them with non-Arab ethnic groups, and also changing the 
Arab names of various places and streets of this province to Persian names. The peaceful 
demonstration on the Ahwaz streets on April 15, 2005, turned violent and antiriot police took 
charge. The circumstances regarding the letter were unclear, but the protest escalated mostly 
because of vast fuelling of the situation on both sides. The revolts coincided with the pan-
Arabist claim over Khuzestan, and the 80
th
 anniversary of the “occupation of lands of 
Alahwaz by Iranian forces”. Additionally, Arab media and especially Aljazeera accentuated 
the conflict, while the USA used it as a pretext to condemn the Iranian government for 
violating the rights of Arabs. The revolt was silent down when the defense minister, a native 
Arab from Khuzestan, Ali Shamkhani travelled to the region and promised speedy release of 
the arrested Arabs, and denied existence of any plan regarding the forces migration of Arabs 
or name changing. The protests calmed down, but were raised again in 2011, to mark 
anniversary of 2005 protests.  
 
IRANIAN SYMBOLIC STRATEGIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
 
Politically, relations between Tehran and GCC countries are substantially better than ever 
before. It can especially be seen in cooperation regarding the oil production in OPEC, while 
Tehran “...seeks to cool the UAE hostility regarding mutual claims to Abu Musa and the Tunb 
islands, working with the other Gulf states to isolate the UAE” (Byman et al, 2001: 75). 
However, the relations cannot be perfect. Firstly, GCC countries care for the close ties with 
Washington and accept the US military presence in the region, a fact Iran cannot bear. The 
need of recognised regional power of Iran is often being blocked by the image of Saudi 
Arabia (and recently Qatar) in Central and West Asia. Iran stopped revolutionary support for 
the anti-regime and Shi’ite groups in the GCC countries, but still wants to see a regional 
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security coalition where only Muslim countries would be present (excluding USA or any 
Western state) and where Iranian power can be matched only by Saudis. At the present, this is 
far from achievable.  
In the meantime, soft symbolic conflicts continue. The name strategy is obvious way to 
determine who has more power and influence. In 2006 Iranians delivered to the UN’s Group 
of experts on geographical names a provisional agenda stating that “...any change, destruction, 
or alteration of the names registered in historical deeds and maps is like the destruction of 
ancient works and is considered as an improper action. (...) the names of geographical features 
(...) should not be utilized as political instruments in reaching a political, tribal and rational 
objective, or in any clash with national interests and other’s values”. The document lists 
number of historical references to the Gulf as Persian (Farsi), beginning from the Pars Sea in 
the Pars Empire, the travel accounts of Pythagoras, Diseark, Herodotus, medieval Islamic 
travellers, to the Portuguese rule of Hormuz, and all the way to at least ten contracts signed 
from 1507 to 1960, including mostly the Arab countries. There are also vastly documented 
maps throughout this period, which attest to the world’s decision to label this gulf as Persian. 
As the final decision, the United Nations use the name too.  
To strengthen this symbol, Islamic Republic proclaimed April 30 as the National Persian Gulf 
Day. The date was chosen in memory of the Shah Abbas’ successful military campaign and 
recapture of the Hormuz Strait from Portuguese in 1622. In 2014 Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB) called this day as one of the important symbols of national identity.
1
 In 
2008 Iran also made new series of postal stamps with clearly visible name of Persian Gulf in 
Farsi and English. The Persian Gulf Studies Centre, an institute of historical, geographical, 
geopolitical and strategic studies of the Persian Gulf has been founded, and it includes the 
online Persian Gulf Museum, a collection of 79 historical maps of the Persian Gulf, including 
the official opinion of UN, documents from British and Portuguese archives, sources from the 
National Geographic and Encyclopaedia Britannica and others.  
Probably the most interesting conflict is seen in the fields of sport. Sport is often used by 
nationalist movements as a tool for resistance under colonialism, but also as a mobilisation of 
masses (Henry, 2003: 301). In 2006 Iran banned all goods tagged with the name of Arabian 
Gulf.
2
 The name dispute is vivid in sports. In 2010 the Islamic Solidarity Games, to be held in 
April that year in Iran, were cancelled, this time because the organising board in Riyadh 
refused to continue with the organisation due to the slogans on the medals and pamphlets of 
the games.
3 In 2013, Iran has barred national football team captain Javad Nekounam’s 
lucrative transfer to a club in UAE because of the name dispute, after the UAE formed veteran 
international “Arab Gulf League.”4 The GCC countries are often the main sponsor to another 
sport games, such as Pan-Arabic games, where political statements are often made, struggling 
for the Arab causes everywhere (Henry, 2003).  
                                                          
1
 http://english.irib.ir/news/iran1/item/186481-iran-commemorates-persian-gulf-day  
2
 http://www.payvand.com/news/06/dec/1270.html  
3
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8465235.stm  
4
 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/21/iran-bars-captain-uae-transfer-over-gulf-name  
14 | P a g e  
 
 
 
The world is somewhat at difficulties regarding the name strategies. In 1999 the Secretariat of 
the United Nations made an editorial directive stating that the term “Persian Gulf” is used by 
the Secretariat as the standard geographical term. Moreover, the term “Gulf” is used by the 
Secretariat to identify or refer to the general geographical area such as the Gulf area, the Gulf 
region and the Gulf States. Amidst all the controversies, Google wanted to stay impartial and 
thus used the name Gulf on its maps. The case irrupted in Tehran with anger.
5
 And while the 
UK and US continue to use the Persian Gulf, as same as the UN, the case of the American 
Navy also gained attention. It named the Gulf as “Persian (Arabian) Gulf.”6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Persian Gulf name dispute, Pan-Arabic calamities, secessions and terrorism in Iran, Shi’a 
victims in Sunni countries, and Iranian name changes, all form the symbolic behaviour rooted 
in the senses of identity and power in the area. By examining the issues at hand, we can better 
understand the relations often simplified as Sunni-Shi’a divide, revolutionary propaganda, or 
the political Islam movements. And while relations don’t have to be wholehearted, the 
common Pan-Islamic desire connects the countries around the Persian Gulf. The national 
question, on other hand, shows resilience to the Pan-Islamism and the overall acceptance of 
dichotomy “Us” versus “Them”.  
Substantially, Iran will continue its nominal acceptance of the ethnic minorities’ rights, while 
reserving its right for symbolic strategies of name changing. The relations between Iran and 
GCC can stay good, but not overall better, not until the kingdoms host American military 
presence, and while UAE poses its interest for the Gulf islands as precondition for the better 
relations.  
Iran combines mythology and symbols stemming from Cyrus the Great, up to the Islamic 
unity and fierce nationalism. On its way to claim the power and influence over the Persian 
Gulf, Iranians meet the macro nationalism of the Pan-Arab idea and micro nationalism of the 
GCC countries, trying to impose symbolically the Arabian (not Arab) character of the whole 
region. The issue causes territorial claims, strategies of name changing, containment of the 
Iranian Arabs, suppression of Shi’a Muslims in Arabian kingdoms, new state holidays, and 
symbolic battles with real consequences. In understanding the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf, 
one has to have this issue in sight.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 http://www.scotsman.com/news/world/iran-s-fury-over-google-not-using-persian-gulf-on-maps-1-2280620  
6
 http://www.allgov.com/news/us-and-the-world/navy-causes-controversy-by-changing-persian-gulf-to-
arabian-gulf?news=841875  
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